In judging Iranian deal, the devil is not in the details – Haaretz

In September 2012, Benjamin Netanyahu stood before the United Nations General Assembly holding a cartoonish drawing of a makeshift bomb, which came to be known as the Wile E. Coyote poster. The gimmick grabbed front page headlines around the world, but as the New York Times reported the next day, Netanyahu’s “attention-grabbing performance seems to have created confusion in, of all places, Israel.”

According to the report, the percentages on Netanyahu’s drawing were supposed to indicate the quantity of sufficiently enriched uranium that Iran was amassing on its way to making a nuclear bomb, but several Israeli analysts misinterpreted it to mean the actual degree of uranium enrichment that Iran had attained. They lambasted Netanyahu for things he never meant to say.

A few short weeks later, however, Israeli officials involved in the nuclear talks came to the conclusion that Netanyahu himself may not have fully comprehended the import of what he was saying. In short time, they started tearing their own hair out.

In what many Israelis and American Jews viewed at the time as a masterful slam-dunk performance on the UN stage, Netanyahu proposed that the international community draw a red line “before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear enrichment necessary to make a bomb”, I.E. before Tehran accumulated enough 20% uranium to produce the far smaller amounts of 90% enriched uranium needed for a bomb. Whatever his intentions were, what Netanyahu achieved, in effect, was to give Tehran a blank check to expand, solidify and upgrade the infrastructure needed to produce a nuclear bomb – including the addition of thousands of new centrifuges – which is exactly what they proceeded to do.

Netanyahu was hoisted on his own petard: as long as the Iranians did not increase their stockpiles of 20% uranium, in Netanyahu’s book they were kosher. A year later, Tehran rammed home just how irrelevant Netanyahu’s famous “red line” was: In January 2014 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran had completely diluted or converted the stockpiles of 20% enriched uranium that Netanyahu had railed against, in accordance with its commitment under the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) signed a few months earlier.

Netanyahu, now re-crowned “the magician” in the wake of his recent electoral victory, did not pay a penalty for his atomic booboo, for one main reason – hardly anyone knew then or understands now what he was on about. Despite their potential to incinerate humanity, the language and mechanics of nuclear energy, weapons and proliferation have long been limited to a very small cadre of nuclear scientists, technicians, academics and negotiators and truly dedicated aficionados; for most everyone else, it’s nothing more than mumbo jumbo. Hearing a true nuclear expert explain the finer points of the proposed accord with Iran, one recalls Casca telling Cassius in Julius Caesar: “Those that understood him smiled at one another and shook their heads; but, for mine own part, it was Greek to me.”

Think about it: How many people can explain the difference between U-235 and U-238? Between the older IR-2m centrifuges and the advanced IR-4 model? Between fission, fusion and thermonuclear bombs? In fact, how many people actually understand how an atomic bomb works and how it is manufactured?

If Netanyahu, who has been involved in nuclear issues for several decades, can get things so wrong, what can one expect from the legions of Israeli, American and other cocksure analysts and lawmakers who might soon be pleading for or against a deal with Iran, if one is ever signed? How can anyone who is less than well versed in the fine print of nuclear matters be expected to reach a learned judgment about the merits or demerits of the arrangements being hammered out in Lausanne?

How will public opinion be able to tell whether 6,000 centrifuges that Iran could be allowed to keep is within an acceptable margin of safety, as defenders will claim, or an outrageous concession that brings Tehran within a few steps of its quest, as the detractors will counter? Is it critical that Iran completely close up its installation in Fordow, or will intrusive inspections do the job? Does it make much of a difference if the so-called “sunset clause” goes into effect after 8 years, ten or 15?

The cliché “the devil is in the details” may be overused by reporters in Lausanne, but the truth is that for most people, including those who are trying to monitor the talks, it’s the grand picture that will determine their attitude towards a deal. Not their knowledge of the intricacies of nuclear mechanics – or, rather, lack thereof – but their prejudices, their instincts and their trust for the people who will be presenting the pros and cons of a nuclear accord, if it is ever reached.

Most Republicans, for example, instinctively distrust Iran and detest Obama much more. At this stage, if Obama were to achieve the best deal in the entire history of nuclear disarmament, you know the GOP would tear it to shreds nonetheless. Most Israelis, I’m sure this won’t shock you, would probably concur.

Taken together with the widespread suspicion and antagonism towards the deal in much of the Arab world, we have the makings of one of the oddest coalitions of all time: right wing Republicans and Evangelical Christians in America, concerned Jews in Israel and around the world and Iran-fearing Sunni Muslims, led by the pious theocracy of Saudi Arabia. Their positions, believe me, won’t change if the details of the deal suddenly seem to improve.

By the same token, most Democrats are likely to support a deal, either because of partisan loyalty to their leader or because they are convinced that, like democracy itself, the alternatives are worse. After Iraq, Afghanistan and ISIS, Iran seems like the one Middle East hellhole that America would do well to avoid, at almost any cost.

In Europe, people are also much more likely to support the deal than to oppose it; everyone prefers peace to war and quick-fix settlements to protracted confrontations, even at the risk of being incessantly bombarded with Munich, 1938 analogies. But opinions in Europe will also be colored, unfortunately, by the continent’s increasingly dim view of Israel, which will equate Netanyahu’s warnings against a nuclear Iran with his objections to Palestinian independence. Others, even more hostile, might very well welcome the dangers that Israelis most fear.

The fate of any agreement, if it comes to that, could very well be determined by the winner of the ongoing one-on-one confrontation between Netanyahu and Obama. For the former, at this point, no deal is better than a good deal, and the details don’t much matter. For the latter, by the same token, almost any deal seems better than no deal, provided it can be sold to the Democratic caucus in Congress.

Notwithstanding his considerable sway in the U.S. legislature, in a showdown with the President the political deck is stacked against him. One can only wonder what might have happened had Netanyahu chosen to cooperate with Obama and possibly coopt him to his views, rather than confronting him openly and repeatedly for all the world to see; and whether this, rather than any misunderstanding of the minutiae of nuclear technology, no matter how profound, wasn’t his biggest mistake.